The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using "gh codespace ssh" or "gh codespace logs" commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0. Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing "ssh" commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for "gh codespace ssh" or "gh codespace logs" commands. This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects "ssh" arguments within the SSH connection details. "gh codespace ssh" and "gh codespace logs" commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like "-oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #". The "-oProxyCommand" flag causes "ssh" to execute the provided command while "#" shell comment causes any other "ssh" arguments to be ignored. In "2.62.0", the remote username information is being validated before being used.