CVE-2025-66559
December 04, 2025
Taiko Alethia is an Ethereum-equivalent, permissionless, based rollup designed to scale Ethereum without compromising its fundamental properties. In 2.3.1 and earlier, TaikoInbox._verifyBatches (packages/protocol/contracts/layer1/based/TaikoInbox.sol:627-678) advanced the local tid to whatever transition matched the current blockHash before knowing whether that batch would actually be verified. When the loop later broke (e.g., cooldown window not yet passed or transition invalidated), the function still wrote that newer tid into batches[lastVerifiedBatchId].verifiedTransitionId after decrementing batchId. Result: the last verified batch could end up pointing at a transition index from the next batch (often zeroed), corrupting the verified chain pointer.
Affected Packages
https://github.com/taikoxyz/taiko-mono.git (GITHUB):
Affected version(s) >=taiko-alethia-protocol-v1.11.0 <=taiko-alethia-protocol-v2.3.0Fix Suggestion:
Update to version no_fixRelated ResourcesĀ (2)
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Contact UsCVSS v4
Base Score:
8
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
HIGH
Vulnerable System Integrity
HIGH
Vulnerable System Availability
NONE
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
Exploit Maturity
UNREPORTED
CVSS v3
Base Score:
9.1
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
HIGH
Integrity
HIGH
Availability
NONE
Weakness Type (CWE)
Improper Validation of Array Index
EPSS
Base Score:
0.06