Impact Two unguarded prototype pollution paths exist, not covered by previous fixes: 1. "config.load()" / "config.loadFile()" — "overlay()" recursively merges config data without checking for forbidden keys. Input containing" proto" or "constructor.prototype" (e.g. from a JSON file) causes the recursion to reach "Object.prototype" and write attacker-controlled values onto it. 2. Schema initialization — passing a schema with "constructor.prototype.*" keys to "convict({...})" causes default-value propagation to write directly to "Object.prototype" at startup. Depending on how polluted properties are consumed, impact ranges from unexpected behavior to authentication bypass or RCE. Workarounds Do not pass untrusted data to load(), loadFile(), or convict(). Resources Prior advisory: "GHSA-44fc-8fm5-q62h" (https://github.com/mozilla/node-convict/security/advisories/GHSA-44fc-8fm5-q62h) Related issue: "https://github.com/mozilla/node-convict/issues/423" (https://github.com/mozilla/node-convict/issues/423)