PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates "webhook_url" when a job request is parsed and again when the internal "Job" object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, "_send_webhook()" passes the original hostname to "httpx.AsyncClient.post()" with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for "GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm" ("Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API"). I defer to maintainers on whether this should be a new advisory/CVE or an amendment to the prior advisory, but current supported releases still appear affected.