A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with "server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA })" but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In "src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc", "CertCbDone" installs the SNI context's CA only when "setSniContext" succeeds, but "setSniContext" returns "false" for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with "requestCert" and "rejectUnauthorized" enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.