CVE-2026-130161
Published:November 19, 2026
Updated:November 20, 2026
Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.
Affected Packages
https://github.com/alexbates/Tamari.git (GITHUB):
Affected version(s) >=v0.7 <v1.7.2 || >=v1.0 <v1.7.2Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v1.7.2Related ResourcesĀ (5)
Do you need more information?
Contact UsCVSS v4
Base Score:
6
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
HIGH
Vulnerable System Integrity
NONE
Vulnerable System Availability
NONE
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
CVSS v3
Base Score:
5.3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
HIGH
Integrity
NONE
Availability
NONE
Weakness Type (CWE)
Server-Side Request Forgery