In versions from 1.5.0 up to and including 3.0.0, any authenticated portal user could complete and tamper with another user's open task by submitting it on their behalf. The task submission endpoint accepted a task ID and a payload, but it never checked whether the task actually belonged to the user making the call. An attacker who held a valid login (a normal "burger" OAuth token) and who knew or guessed another user's task ID could: - Mark someone else's task as completed. - Overwrite the data submitted with that task — the "verzonden_data" — with arbitrary input of their choosing. - Receive the full task back in the GraphQL response, including the form data that the legitimate owner had already entered. This leaks personal data belonging to the original user. Functionally this means a malicious authenticated user could submit and alter forms in any other user's name, while at the same time reading what that user had previously filled in. Both the integrity of submitted data and the confidentiality of form contents are affected. The vulnerable code was introduced together with the Taak V2 implementation (commit "bb1c1ecf", 2024-06-04) and first shipped in the "1.5.x" release line. Earlier 1.x releases did not contain this resolver.