CVE-2026-52739
Published:August 18, 2026
Updated:September 23, 2026
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Affected Packages
zebra-state (RUST):
Affected version(s) >=0.0.0-placeholder.0 <7.0.0Fix Suggestion:
Update to version 7.0.0zebrad (RUST):
Affected version(s) >=0.0.0-placeholder.0 <4.5.0Fix Suggestion:
Update to version 4.5.0Related Resources (9)
Do you need more information?
Contact UsCVSS v4
Base Score:
8.2
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
NONE
Vulnerable System Integrity
NONE
Vulnerable System Availability
HIGH
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
CVSS v3
Base Score:
5.9
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
NONE
Integrity
NONE
Availability
HIGH
Weakness Type (CWE)
Uncaught Exception
EPSS
Base Score:
0.39