The Dragonfly scheduler's v1 gRPC service contains an unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). When a peer reports a successful download of a TINY task, the scheduler calls "Peer.DownloadTinyFile()" and issues an HTTP "GET" to a host and port taken verbatim from the attacker-controlled "PeerHost.Ip" / "PeerHost.DownPort" fields of the gRPC request body. The HTTP client uses a bare "http.Transport" with no address validation, so a remote, unauthenticated client can force the scheduler to connect to arbitrary internal addresses, including "127.0.0.1" (loopback), "169.254.0.0/16" (link-local, e.g. cloud metadata), and RFC1918 ranges. The fetched response is stored in "Task.DirectPiece" and can subsequently be served to other peers, making this a read-SSRF with a data-exfiltration path. The manager's preheat code path already wraps its HTTP client with "nethttp.NewSafeDialer()" (which rejects non-global-unicast destinations); the scheduler's "DownloadTinyFile" path is missing this guard (sibling gap).