Summary An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the "agent_file" field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs. Details The "agent_file" field in "JobSubmitRequest" accepts any filesystem path with no validation: src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29 agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file") NO path validator, NO allowlist The executor reads the file directly: src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221 agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml" passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file)) Proof of Concept curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}' Server responds with contents of "/etc/passwd". Other exploitable paths: - "/proc/1/environ" — environment variables, API keys - "/home//.ssh/id_rsa" — SSH private keys - "/app/.env" — application secrets Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.