SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, in the reported deployment, case-report templates uploaded by "customer_user", the lowest-privilege portal role, are later executed by non-sandboxed Jinja2 engines when an admin or analyst generates a report. The "/case-report-template/upload" route in "backend/app/incidents/routes/db_operations.py" validates only the filename-derived MIME type, not the template content. Templates share a global store without customer_code scoping, and "customer_user" can also list, download and delete them, allowing an attacker to replace a legitimate default template under the same name. In "backend/app/incidents/services/reports.py", "render_document_with_context" uses "DocxTemplate" without a sandbox; in "backend/app/incidents/services/reports_pdf.py", "render_html_template" uses a non-sandboxed "Environment" without autoescaping. Normal privileged requests to "POST /api/incidents/report/generate-report-docx" or "/generate-report-pdf" therefore evaluate attacker-controlled Jinja expressions as Python on the backend. The reported deployment executes commands as root, exposing all tenants' incident and SIEM data and stored connector credentials. The HTML/PDF wkhtmltopdf renderer additionally permits local-file reads and requests to internal services. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.