"BinaryHttpParser" decodes Binary HTTP (RFC 9292) messages. An OHTTP gateway/client built on this library feeds the decrypted OHTTP body straight into "BinaryHttpParser.parse(...)". The field-section decoding loop terminates only on the exact condition "fieldSectionLength != 0" and relies on a Java "assert" to guarantee forward progress. Because (a) the loop counter can be driven negative and (b) "readFieldLine(...)" legitimately consumes zero bytes and returns "null" on a truncated/over-long field line, the loop can spin forever. Assertions are disabled in any normal production JVM, so the two "assert" statements meant to catch this provide no protection. A single ~17-byte Binary HTTP message — encapsulated by an unauthenticated attacker inside a normal OHTTP request, using the gateway's public key configuration — pins one Netty event-loop thread at 100% CPU permanently. A handful of such requests exhausts the entire event-loop group and takes the OHTTP gateway (or client) fully offline.