Impact An authenticated user who can import project backups can craft a backup containing a "weblate://" repository link to a component they cannot access. During restoration, Weblate did not enforce the component.edit permission check used by the normal UI and API. The imported component could consequently share the private target component’s checkout, allowing the attacker to: - Read private source strings and translations. - Modify translation files and commit changes that could later be pushed to the victim’s upstream repository. This affects multi-user or multi-tenant Weblate installations where untrusted users have project.add or workspace.add_project permission. Knowledge of the target project and component slugs is required. Weblate versions from 4.14 through 2026.7.1 are affected. ### Patches The issue is patched in Weblate 2026.8 and later. Backup restoration now resolves internal repository links using the importing user’s permissions. Components referencing missing, inaccessible, or invalid linked repositories are skipped and reported to the importer. Users should upgrade to Weblate 2026.8 or later. * https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/20770 ### Workarounds Until upgrading, restrict project backup imports to fully trusted users. In particular, revoke project.add and workspace.add_project permissions from untrusted accounts or disable access to the project import flow. Administrators should also audit projects imported by untrusted users for components whose repository is a cross-project weblate:// link, and remove any link whose creator was not authorized to edit the target component. ### References Thanks to “Plowed field” for reporting this via HackerOne.