CVE-2026-93667
Published:November 16, 2026
Updated:November 18, 2026
The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled).
The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.
The resulting call passes a struct net_if where the driver expects a struct device and a struct net_pkt where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.
The same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.
Affected Packages
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr.git (GITHUB):
Affected version(s) >=v4.4.0-rc1 <v4.5.0Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v4.5.0https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr.git (GITHUB):
Affected version(s) >=v4.2.0-rc1 <v4.3.2Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v4.3.2Related ResourcesĀ (5)
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Contact UsCVSS v4
Base Score:
6
Attack Vector
ADJACENT
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
NONE
Vulnerable System Integrity
LOW
Vulnerable System Availability
HIGH
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
CVSS v3
Base Score:
5.9
Attack Vector
ADJACENT
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
NONE
Integrity
LOW
Availability
HIGH