WS-2026-0071
Published:September 06, 2026
Updated:September 10, 2026
ArangoDB privilege escalation via the isSystem task flag. RestTasksHandler read isSystem from the POST /_api/tasks request body and passed it straight to Task::createTask() with no privilege check, letting a database user with write permissions schedule a JavaScript task that runs in a privileged internal context; in the official containers arangod runs as root, so this reaches root-level file operations and code execution. The V8 path enforced securityContext.isInternal() while the REST path enforced nothing. Affects releases up to and including 3.12.10.1; fixed in 3.12.11 by requiring exec.isSuperuserOrDisabled().
Affected Packages
https://github.com/arangodb/arangodb.git (GITHUB):
Affected version(s) >=v2.6.0 <v3.12.11Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v3.12.11Related Resources (1)
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Contact UsCVSS v4
Base Score:
9.4
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
HIGH
Vulnerable System Integrity
HIGH
Vulnerable System Availability
HIGH
Subsequent System Confidentiality
HIGH
Subsequent System Integrity
HIGH
Subsequent System Availability
HIGH
CVSS v3
Base Score:
9.9
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
CHANGED
Confidentiality
HIGH
Integrity
HIGH
Availability
HIGH
Weakness Type (CWE)
Missing Authorization